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Abstract
A major element in the creation of the European area of higher education is the adoption of
a common structure of degrees, implying in several countries the reduction of the duration of the
first degree to three years, which is a controversial change. Cardoso et al. (2008) have analyzed
student confidence in the curricula change, quantifying its impact on students’ first choices of
academic programs. This paper goes two steps further. First, it concentrates on a variable that
better translates total demand for an academic program, namely the total number of students
who place the program among their six revealed preferences, instead of just the first option; and,
second, an econometric model that better fits the data is estimated. Results confirm a positive
impact of the Bologna process on the demand for programs, which varies with program size and
across fields of study. Our results complement those in Cardoso et al. (2008), as they uncover that
being a program leader, i.e. the only institution in the country that restructured a given program,
was associated with higher demand by prospective students, which nevertheless stemmed from
their “second best” options and not from their first choices.
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1 Introduction
The Bologna process is a far-reaching reform that aims at creating by 2010 a European
higher education area, expected to foster the mobility of citizens, the employability of
graduates, and the overall development of the Continent. Among the central features
of the Bologna reform is a re-definition of the curricula, a student-centered learning, the
definition of learning-outcomes, the development of competencies, and the implementa-
tion of a two-tier system, where a three-year shorter first cycle (Bachelor), is followed
by a one year and a half or two-year second cycle (Master) (European Ministers of
Education, 1999). The two-tier system is expected to enhance flexibility, with students
entering the labor market after the end of the first cycle and eventually returning to
the higher education system to take the Master that better fits their interests. Jacobs
and van der Ploeg (2006) discuss the potential benefits of a two-tier system, based on
the experience of Anglo-Saxon countries. Whether Europe will rip the benefits of the
reform under course remains to be confirmed by labor market and students’ mobility
data, which is not available yet.
So far, studies have analyzed the perceptions of society on the Bologna reform
through survey evidence. Most noticeable, reports by the European University Asso-
ciation (EUA) have collected information from hundreds of European universities and
have provided a broad picture of the implementation of the Bologna process. These
reports conclude that the reform has followed different paces, across and within coun-
tries, and that the coexistence of the old and new systems in some countries has most
likely favored the surge of controversy on its implementation among higher education
institutions, students and labor markets (see, for example, Crosier, Purser and Smidt,
2007). Controversies result, on the one hand, from different visions on the nature of
the reform and, on the other hand, from insufficient transparency and information con-
veyed by higher education institutions (Crosier, Purser and Smidt, 2007). For example,
according to that report, only 22% of the institutions surveyed reported that most of
their students will enter the labor market after finishing the first cycle. Employers’
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lack of information on the Bologna principles, on the one side, and the belief, among
academics and parents, that the Master’s level is the ‘real degree’ may explain the
apparent reluctance of graduates to enter the labor market after concluding their first
cycle of studies (Crosier, Purser and Smidt, 2007).
In one of the few studies that analyze the Bologna process from the students’ stand-
point, Cardoso, Portela, Sa´ and Alexandre (2008) assess the impact of the Bologna
process on students’ demand, as measured by applicants’ first choice when applying to
enter university. Their findings indicate a positive impact of the reform on demand,
which, however, hides variation across fields of study and program size. Namely, the
Bologna impact is clearly positive for study programs in the field of education, whereas
health study programs appear to face lower demand.
This paper goes two steps further. First, we use an alternative proxy for demand, by
computing the total demand, rather than first choices. That is, we measure demand
as the total number of students that include a given program among their choices,
no matter its rank.1 Second, a different specification of the econometric model, sug-
gested by Allison and Waterman (2002), which better fits the type of data available,
is estimated. The analysis refers to the Portuguese higher education setting and uses
administrative data on the application processes for the academic years of 2003/2004
to 2006/2007.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the implementation
of the Bologna process in Portugal. Section 3 describes the dataset and the empirical
strategy. The impact of the Bologna process is quantified in Section 4, while Section 5
concludes.
2 The implementation of the Bologna process in Portugal
Although the Bologna declaration had been the subject of discussions in academia
and in professional bodies —several workshops were organized to discuss the reform
1Note that when applying to higher education, students rank up to six pairs program/institution.
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in different disciplines—, only after the publication, in 2005, of the legislation that
rendered possible the adoption of the two-tier system did the process of reform in the
Portuguese higher education institutions gain momentum. According to instructions
from the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education (MCTES), higher
educations institutions could restructure their study programs according to the Bologna
principles beginning in 2006/2007, with 2008/2009 as deadline. The response varied
across higher educations institutions, with some institutions restructuring all their
study programs, other restructuring some of the study programs and other institutions
deciding to delay the implementation of Bologna principles to the next two years.
Therefore, in 2006/2007 Bologna-type programs coexisted with old-style programs,
both in the same institution and in the same field of study. The co-existence of the
two-type of programs may have contributed, as mentioned above, to the controversy
over the advantages of the new paradigm.
Additionally, the Bologna reform occurred in the absence of an Agency of Accredi-
tation and, therefore, without quality control mechanisms. This may have favored the
implementation in ‘form’ rather than in ‘substance’, that is, reducing the number of
years to finish the first cycle but keeping old curricula and learning processes.2 Just
like for other European countries, researchers will have to wait for labor market data
and for the evaluation process of the recently created Accreditation Agency to evaluate
how deep the reform in the Portuguese higher education system was.
As highlighted by Crosier, Purser and Smidt (2007), a ‘national understanding of
reforms’ is crucial for their success. It is therefore relevant to assess the behavior of
students and labor market during the period of adjustment to the Bologna changes
in higher education curricula. In this paper, we use information on students’ choices
to evaluate the support that this process has received from the Portuguese society, in
particular, from the Portuguese students.
2Veiga and Amaral (2008) present survey results from all Portuguese higher education institutions that changed
their study programs’ curricula according to the Bologna principles in 2006/2007. According to these authors, evidence
suggests that the implementation of the Bologna principles was more ‘form’ than ‘substance’.
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3 Dataset and empirical strategy
The Portuguese higher education system is a binary system, with universities and poly-
technics. In principle, universities should provide academic training, whereas polytech-
nics are in charge of preparing students for a profession. On the supply side there are
constraints imposed by a system of numerus clausus. Students rank up to 6 pairs study
program/institution, from the most preferred to the 6th preference. A national compe-
tition follows, with students allocated to the available places based on their grade point
average, which is a weighted average of high school and national exams grades. There
are two application phases. The first one takes place in July/August. The second
phase takes place in September and includes the places not filled in the first phase.
The application process is centralized, such that the Department of Higher Educa-
tion (Direcc¸a˜o Geral do Ensino Superior) of the MSTHE gathers information on all
candidates’ choice sets. These administrative data, collected for the whole applicant
population and all study programs offered at public higher education institutions, have
been made available on-line for the academic years from 2003/2004 to 2006/2007, for
both the first and the second phases.3 The unit of analysis is a study program in a
given higher education institution. The data set contains all study programs in both
higher education sectors: polytechnics and universities.
Such comprehensive dataset made it possible to build a program demand variable,
the variable to be explained in our model. The demand for each program at an in-
stitution is, then, quantified as the number of applicants who placed that program in
that institution among their choices, no matter its rank. We call this variable hits.
In Cardoso et al. (2008) demand is proxied by candidates’ first choices. We believe
that hits better proxies program demand, as it contains information on all students
that reveal some interest on a program, that is the total potential demand, rather than
only on their favorite program. Given the context of numerus clausus in which the
application process takes place, the total potential demand may be of major interest
as not all students are allocated to their best choice.
3The data are available at http://www.acessoensinosuperior.pt.
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Cardoso et al. (2008) model program demand by means of a fixed effects negative
binomial model based on the following arguments. First, given that the dependent
variable is a positive integer and its distribution is skewed to the left, a count data
type of model (poisson or negative binomial) is appropriate. Second, given that there
are repeated observations for the demand for each program, as the data available allows
for the computation of demand for four academic years and two phases each year, it
is possible to account for unobserved heterogeneity by means of a fixed effect model.
Finally, the descriptive statistics and a formal statistical test reveal that the assumption
of equal mean and variance is not appropriate, which suggests the use of a fixed effects
binomial negative model. The present study also departures from our previous analysis
by improving the model estimated. According to Allison and Waterman (2002), the
fixed effects in the context of the negative binomial do not have the same meaning that
we are used to in other contexts, as they only apply to the overdispersion parameter. In
order to avoid this problem, we follow the suggestion by Allison and Waterman (2002)
and we estimate, based on the pooled sample, an unconditional negative binomial
model with dummy variables to account for the program/institution fixed effects.4
In the context of this model, the total demand for higher education programs is
explained based on a set of program’s characteristics, similar to those used by Cardoso
et al. (2008). First of all, we consider three explanatory variables that capture the
group of Bologna adopters: (i) Bologna implementer - a program at an institution,
which has been restructured according to the Bologna process; (ii) Bologna leader - a
Bologna implementer, who was the only institution in the country that restructured
that academic program; (iii) Integrated master - a Bologna implementer that never-
theless did not shorten its duration, i.e. programs that offer a joint first and second
cycle degree, thus keeping a longer duration while having restructured to comply with
Bologna.
The model controls for other factors that may have had an impact on study pro-
grams’ demand such as the major national admission exams (dummy variables for
4For technical details on the choice of the model, see the Appendix.
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Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Portuguese, which are the exams with
the highest failure rate), given that a generally poor performance in the admission
exam in a certain subject reduces the pool of potential applicants. Moreover, we con-
trol for the scientific field of the program (9 dummy variables), since different fields
reacted differently to the implementation of the Bologna process. We also account for
the phase of the application process, with a dummy variable equal to one in the second
phase. Given sharp differences in the dimension of the different programs and across
institutions, we also control for the size of the program (number of vacancies posted).
Interactions between the Bologna variables presented above and some control variables
are included as well.
Table 1: Summary statistics by year and phase
2003 2004 2005 2006
Variable Ph1 Ph2 Ph1 Ph2 Ph1 Ph2 Ph1 Ph2
Number of institutions/programs 946 903 989 942 1012 976 985 965
Number of candidates 41662 15514 42595 10348 38976 13688 40521 15432
University 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.49
New study programs 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.06
Demand: number of hits 196.94 64.95 195.25 38.35 178.61 56.20 194.22 69.36
(207.70) (55.73) (204.13) (36.56) (227.91) (52.30) (230.33) (59.93)
Bologna implementer 0.43 0.43
Bologna leader 0.17 0.17
Integrated master 0.04 0.04
Program size (vacancies) 45.66 14.21 44.69 12.92 44.23 16.96 46.96 17.20
(33.19) (13.40) (39.27) (12.24) (38.99) (17.46) (38.76) (16.69)
Exams:
maths 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.21 0.21
physics 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
chemistry 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
biology 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11
portuguese 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Field of study:
agriculture 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
architecture 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
natural sciences 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
law, social sciecnes 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17
economics, business 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
sports, arts 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
education 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08
humanities 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08
health 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
technologies 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22
Notes: Ph1 and Ph2 stand for phases 1 and 2 in the application process, respectively. Standard deviations
are shown in parenthesis, while the remaining numbers are averages, with the exception of the last two rows
which show the number of observations and the number of candidates.
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics on those variables for every academic year
from 2003/2004 to 2006/2007, for the two application phases. It is evident that about
43% of the academic programs have adjusted to Bologna in 2006/2007. About 17%
of the programs are leaders in Bologna implementation, while only 4% opted to be
an integrated master. In 2006/2007 the most required exam is Math, followed by
Biology and Portuguese, which are required by 21%, 11% and 7% of the programs,
respectively. The least required are Chemistry and Physics, demanded by 5% and 2%
of the programs, respectively. Interesting enough is that these exams, which face the
lowest passing rates, are less and less required. The highest decrease goes for Math,
which was a requirement for 33% of the programs in 2003/2004, but only to 21%
in 2006/2007. When we look to the fields of study in the school year of 2006/2007,
the biggest share of programs is in the field of Technologies (about 22% of the total
number of programs). It is followed by Law and Social Sciences, with 16% of the study
programs, and Economics and Business and Health, both fields representing 11% each.
The least represented field is Sports and Arts, with 3% of the programs. We should
highlight the increase, in the first phase, in the programs in the field of Law and Social
Sciences; its quota has increased from 11% in 2003/2004 to 16% in 2006/2007. It is also
visible the decrease in the relative importance of the field of Education, which studies
represented 13% of the all offer in 2003/2004, but only 7% in 2006/2007. In the field
of Humanities the decreased has been from 11% to 8% over the same period. Health
increased 1 percentage point, while Technologies decreased 2 percentage points. The
average program size in the first phase is bounded between 44 and 47, a stable figure
during the period under analysis. The second phase is characterized by an average
number of vacancies bounded between 13 and 17.
The proportion of University programs evolved from 52% in 2003/2004 to 49% in
2006/2007, which means that polytechnic studies are gaining relative importance in
terms of the total number of programs. In 2003/2004, about 4% of the available study
programs were newly created. That number doubled in the folowing year, but decreased
to 6% in 2006/2007. The average number of hits per program in the first phase has
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remained relatively stable: around 195 hits, with the exception being the school year of
2005/2006 when it decreased to about 177 average hits. The dispersion of the average
number of hits, considering the first phase, has increased from around 208 in 2003/2004
to about 230 in 2006/2007. If we look at the second phase the dispersion varies between
37 in 2004/2005 and 60 in 2006/2007.
Finally, it is interesting to look at the pool of applicants. The number of candidates
in the first phase has slightly decreased between 2003/2004 and 2006/2007, going from
41662 candidates in the beginning of the period to 40521 in the most recent year.
In 2005/2006 the system registered the lowest number of candidates, 38976, during
the period of analysis. For the second phase the number of candidates was stable
above 15 thousand candidates in 2003/2004 and 2006/2007. It registered, however, a
significant decrease in 2004/2005, 10348 candidates, but recovered in 2005/2006 (13688
candidates).
4 The Bologna process and demand for programs
Estimation results from the negative binomial model on the total program demand,
using the explanatory variables described above, are reported in Table 2. We present
the first three specifications for benchmark purposes. The first specification is our
base specification. Specification 2 further allows the impact of Bologna to diverge
between leader and non-leader programs. Specification 3 alternatively checks whether
the impact of the Bologna process has been different for integrated masters and other
programs. Finally, Specification 4 combines the previous specifications. The sign and
significance of the coefficients do not vary much across specifications and therefore
for interpretation purposes we will refer below to the most complete specification,
Specification 4.5
In general, programs that restructured to comply with the Bologna principles were
5The log-likelihood for each estimation reported at the bottom of Table 2 provides evidence in favor of our option
for Specification 4, since this is the estimation reporting the lowest log-likelihood in absolute value. The α parameter
reveals that there is overdispersion (it relates to the presence of a higher than expected variance), which justifies the
use of the negative binomial model. In our analysis we use 1323 programs of study, corresponding to 7718 observations.
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subject to an increase in demand, when compared to programs that did not restructure.
This effect (slowly) decreases with the size of the academic program. For example, a
program posting 50 vacancies saw its demand increase by 26%.6 The impact becomes
negative for programs with more than 108 vacancies (note however that over 94% of
the programs post less vacancies than this benchmark). Since the Bologna dummy
variable also enters the regression interacted with the field of study, these results on
the impact of Bologna on program demand refer to the baseline field, Humanities.
The results are not significantly different for programs in Law and Social Sciences,
Economics and Business, Sports and Arts, Education, and Technologies; i.e., Bologna
also has a positive impact on these fields of study. Agriculture, Architecture, Natural
Sciences, and Health show a significantly lower impact of the Bologna process when
compared to Humanities. For Architecture, the results indicate that the impact of
Bologna on demand is negative. The impact of the Bologna process is different by field
of study. This might result from the fact that we are dealing with different market
segments, where the incentives to choose can be quite diverse.
Table 2: Demand for academic programs, negative binomial model with
academic program fixed effects
Variable Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
Bologna implementer 0.456∗∗ 0.396∗ 0.489∗∗ 0.431∗∗
(0.215) (0.207) (0.214) (0.206)
Bologna implementer * program size -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Bologna leader 0.178∗ 0.165∗
(0.092) (0.091)
Bologna leader * program size -0.001 -0.0006
(0.002) (0.001)
Integrated master 0.036 0.052
(0.112) (0.112)
Integrated master * program size 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Bologna implementer * field of study:
agriculture -0.413∗ -0.418∗ -0.439∗ -0.443∗
(0.251) (0.241) (0.251) (0.240)
law, social sciences -0.292 -0.298 -0.277 -0.285
(0.229) (0.222) (0.228) (0.220)
architecture -0.474∗∗ -0.510∗∗ -0.510∗∗ -0.549∗∗
(0.228) (0.226) (0.229) (0.227)
natural sciences -0.426∗ -0.447∗ -0.415∗ -0.439∗
Continued on next page...
6The overall impact being equal to [exp(0.431− 0.004 ∗ size)− 1] ∗ 100.
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... table 2 continued
Variable Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
(0.245) (0.237) (0.244) (0.236)
economics, business -0.222 -0.215 -0.203 -0.196
(0.239) (0.232) (0.238) (0.231)
sports, arts 0.015 -0.088 0.009 -0.092
(0.673) (0.669) (0.664) (0.664)
education 0.015 -0.079 0.033 -0.068
(0.313) (0.316) (0.311) (0.315)
health -0.382 -0.338 -0.436∗ -0.390∗
(0.242) (0.234) (0.237) (0.229)
technologies -0.202 -0.198 -0.265 -0.265
(0.226) (0.219) (0.227) (0.220)
Program size (vacancies) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Phase 2 -0.902∗∗∗ -0.903∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Exam:
maths -0.443∗∗∗ -0.445∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
physics -0.576∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.580∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.128)
chemistry -0.126 -0.127 -0.122 -0.122
(0.088) (0.086) (0.088) (0.087)
biology -0.545∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ -0.548∗∗∗ -0.547∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
portuguese -0.123 -0.111 -0.122 -0.110
(0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087)
α 0.115∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
N 7718 7718 7718 7718
N-g 1323 1323 1323 1323
LL -35712.13 -35706.39 -35698.47 -35692.73
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. Standard errors in parentheses: Huber-White
adjusted standard errors, considering clustering of observations within each academic program for
different moments in time. N is the number of observations, N-g is the number of groups institu-
tion/program, and LL stands for log-likelihood. All regressions include year controls, their interaction
with field of study, and institution/program-specific dummy variables.
The positive coefficient on the Bologna leader variable indicates that, if a program
was restructured at one single institution in the country, it benefited from an increase in
demand over Bologna implementers in general. This additional impact with respect to
Bologna implementers in general took place irrespective of the size of the Bologna leader
(see the insignificant coefficient on the interaction of Bologna leader with program
size). This result complements those in Cardoso et al. (2008), when analyzing the first
options, which had shown that the Bologna process had no impact on the number of
first choices that bologna leaders received. The increase in demand faced by Bologna
leader programs that is now uncovered therefore stems from students’ ‘second best’
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choices and not their first option.
Programs that restructured to become integrated masters were subject as well to
a positive impact above the impact for Bologna implementers in general. The overall
impact on integrated masters increases with the size of the program.
Finally, looking at the control variables, larger programs (posting more vacancies),
as expected, are subject to larger demand. Also quite naturally, the second phase
gathers a remarkably lower number of applications, since it is a residual phase. The
demand for a higher education program is strongly affected by the performance of the
candidates in the national admission exams, with exams on Biology, Mathematics or
Physics lowering the demand for the program.
5 Concluding remarks
We have checked the impact on the demand for academic programs resulting from
changes in the curricula currently taking place under the Bologna process. The rele-
vance of the issue follows from the mix of enthusiasm and criticism that these changes
have raised, in countries where the first degree of higher education used to last for four
or five years and is now reduced to three years. Results indicate that most programs
that changed their curricula to comply with the Bologna principles were subject to an
increase in demand by prospective students, indicative of support for the shorter first
degree. Nevertheless, their receptiveness to the curricula changes varied across fields
of study and with program size. Interesting enough is the fact that the increase in
demand faced by institutions that were the only ones in the country that restructured
a given academic program came from ‘second best’ choices and not from students’ first
choices.
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Appendix
Given that the dependent variable is a positive integer and its distribution is skewed
to the left, Poisson models are an adequate tool (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Fur-
thermore, we have data for four school years and two phases, that is, the data shows a
panel structure with repeated observations on the same program and institution, which
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allows controlling for study program characteristics that are not observable, but are
assumed constant over time. So, a possible solution would be to use the fixed effects
Poisson model, to take into account for this unobserved heterogeneity across academic
programs. This type of models assumes that there is no overdispersion, which is to say
that the mean and the variance of the variable being modeled are identical. The descrip-
tive statistics, however, reveal that the dependent variable presents raw overdispersion.
This indicates that the negative binomial regression model might be more appropriate
for our data, since it relaxes the hypothesis of equal mean and variance. The results of
formal overdispersion tests indeed show clearly that a negative binomial specification
is more appropriate. The test is based on the idea that a fixed effects Poisson model
can be seen as a multinomial model (see Guimara˜es and Lindrooth, 2007), implying
that testing for overdispersion in the multinomial model can be achieved by testing for
overdispersion in the Poisson model. We then use a Pearson test for the null hypothesis
of no overdispersion in the multinomial model, which is rejected at any ordinary level
of significance in all the specifications reported.
Allison and Waterman (2002), however, point out that the fixed-effects negative
binomial model, as defined by Hausman et al. (1984), is not a fixed-effects model in
the usual sense, because the fixed effect applies to the overdispersion parameter, rather
than to the covariates. That is, that model specification solves the overdispersion
problem, but does not guarantee that the program-specific effects are conditioned out
of the likelihood. As such, a test for the null hypothesis of successful removal of the
fixed effects is required. To our knowledge, the only test available is that proposed
by Guimara˜es (2008). When applied to our data, that test rejects the null hypothesis
of overdispersion. Nevertheless, according to the simulations performed by Guimara˜es
(2008), the test is not recommended for samples with small time dimensions, as is our
case. According to Guimara˜es (2008: 65) “with panels as large as 1000 individuals the
test requires at least 20 observations per individual to adequately control for type I
error.”
Combining the arguments and the results we obtained, we have decided to imple-
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ment the strategy proposed by Allison and Waterman (2002). This consists on the
estimation on the pooled sample of an unconditional negative binomial model with
dummy variables to account for the program/institution fixed effects. This is the most
adequate solution to deal with unobserved heterogeneity in a count data model and at
the same time take into account the difference between the variance and the mean of
the distribution.
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